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THE GHOULS THAT WON'T Go AWAY-THE DIRE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES POSED BY THE GHOST
FLEET IN THE JAMES RIVER
L. CHRISTOPHER NOLAND*
INTRODUCTION
Just off the banks of the James River in Newport News,
Virginia, lies the bulk of the National Defense Reserve Fleet
("NDRF"), a floating graveyard of old and decaying government
ships known as the "Ghost Fleet."' Polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs"), asbestos, and nearly thirteen million gallons of oil and
fuel fill these decommissioned cargo military support vessels.2 The
unused and decaying ships are "antique erector sets left out in the
rain," pose a grave environmental threat, and offer terrorists
potential targets.3
Hurricane Isabel, like the hurricanes that ravaged Florida
in 2004, caused $3.37 billion worth of damage and left more than
1.6 million customers without power in the Commonwealth of
Virginia.4 Had one of the vessels in the Ghost Fleet broken free, it
* L. Christopher Noland received his B.A. in Politics and Economics from
Washington and Lee University in 1999. The author is a 2006 J.D./M.B.A.
candidate at the College of William and Mary. He would like to thank his parents,
Hennie and Bud Noland, for their love and support throughout law school and
during the writing of this Note. He would also like to thank his grandfather,
Lloyd U. Noland, Jr., for keeping him supplied with news articles on the topic.
Thanks also to Patterson Hood, Keith Richards, and the Robinson brothers.
' Bill Coffin, Risk Reporter: Ghost Fleet Underscores Ship Recycling Hazards,
RISK MGMT. MAG., Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://rims.org/MGTemplate.cfm?
Section=RMMagazine&template=Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&AID=221
2&ShowArticle= 1.
2 Eric M. Weiss, Ships Anchored in the Past: U.S. 'Ghost Fleet' Poses
Environmental and Other Dangers, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at C1.3Id.
" The Free Dictionary, Hurricane Isabel, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.
comHurricane%20Isabel (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
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is easy to imagine a scenario in which the devastation would have
been far worse.
Two rusty cargo ships anchored side-by-side in the
James River Reserve Fleet rip open in a major storm.
More than 282,000 gallons of heavy oil, as dark and
thick as molasses, pour into the James [River].
Within 48 hours, a black blanket of petroleum
washes north onto Jamestown Island, a national
landmark. Across the river, the sticky oil laps against
an intake pipe that draws cooling water for the Surry
nuclear power plant. The spill also rolls south to the
tip of Newport News and Portsmouth. Along the way,
it soils sandy beaches, state wildlife sanctuaries, a
historical park, prime bird and duck habitat, scenic
waterfront properties, oyster seed grounds, clam
beds, inland creeks and tidal marshes.5
In fact, thirty ships in the fleet broke free during Tropical Storm
Floyd in 1999, but fortunately, none of these ships leaked.6 Nine
spills have occurred between 2000 and 2003, however. The largest
spill, from the U.S.S. Donner in August of 2000, poured 1,000
gallons of oil into the James River,7 and led Virginia's Governor,
Mark Warner, to threaten to sue the U.S. Maritime Administra-
tion ("MARAD"), a division of the United States Department of
Transportation, to have the ships removed.'
As a result of these spills, MARAD increased the thorough-
ness of its hull inspections and ordered the removal of heavy fuel
from a few of the worst-offending ships in the fleet.9 While
Congress has required that MARAD remove and dismantle all of
' Scott Harper, 'Ghost Fleet' Could Unleash Disastrous Spill in a storm, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, April 7, 2002, available at http://www.hamptonroads.coml
pilotonline/special/ghostfleet/partl.html.
6Id.
'Weiss, supra note 2.
' Dave Schleck, Plans Set to Scrap 4 Ships in Ghost Fleet, DAILY PRESS, Sept. 28,
2004, at C5.
' Harper, supra note 5.
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the ships by September 30, 2006, a lack of funding will make
meeting the deadline difficult.'0 Robert Berry, co-Chief Operating
Officer of International Shipbreaking Limited in Brownsville,
Texas, said, "[MARAD] waited too long. There's not enough time.
I don't think they can put enough money into it to do it as quick as
they need.""
By September of 2004, the James River Reserve Fleet
("JRRF") consisted of eighty-three ships. Sixty have been deemed
obsolete and must be disposed of while the remaining twenty-three
are identified for military and salvage purposes.12 While the federal
government, through MARAD, acknowledges the need to dispose of
these ancient vessels to prevent an environmental catastrophe, it is
not adequately funding the disposal effort. 3 In fact:
The Maritime Administration estimates that it would
cost $2.5 million to scrap each of the 136 obsolete
vessels moored today at its three national deposito-
ries-on the James River; in Beaumont, Texas; and
in Suisun Bay, Calif. In 2000, the agency recom-
mended a 14-year disposal program in which compet-
ing American shipyards would be paid to handle all
the work. Estimated costs ranged between $666
million and $1.33 billion, and the program would
involve more ships than just the obsolete ones."a
Even with this recommendation in place, President Clinton
appropriated only $10 million for the effort in his final budget, 5
and President Bush asked for only $11 million in his first year
in office.' 6
10 Id.
11 David Lerman, Money Lacking for Ship Disposal, DAILY PRESS, Feb. 13, 2004,
at A8.
12 Schleck, supra note 8.
13 Harper, supra note 5.
141d.
15 Id.
16 Id.
2006] 515
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 30:513
Part One of this Note describes the history of the JRRF and
explains the progressing and looming crisis in the James River. 7
Part Two of the note includes an analysis, which concludes that
the exportation of retired vessels to foreign countries for recycling
is environmentally and socially irresponsible.'" Part Two also
examines the Basel Convention and Europe's ban on the exporta-
tion of toxic substances.'9 In addition to describing the potential
catastrophe of PCBs, oil leaks, or the sinking of a vessel while in
transit, this section examines the methods employed by England
and other developed nations in salvaging their aged fleets.2 ° Part
Two concludes by examining the lawsuits filed to keep the ships
from leaving American waters.2' Part Three focuses on the
domestic solutions available to this problem.22 In addition to
explaining how to dismantle the ships in the United States, this
section addresses the funding necessary to pay for the process and
offers explanations for why domestic disposal of the ships, has not
occurred.23 The Note concludes that the Commonwealth of Virginia
should sue the federal government for immediate removal of these
ships, as violations of the Toxic Substances Control Act and the
National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994.24
I. HISTORY OF THE JAMES RIVER RESERVE FLEET
The National Defense Reserve Fleet ("NDRF") is called the
"Ghost Fleet,"25 "a flotilla of aging and decrepit government ships."26
The Merchant Sales Act of 1946, as amended, created the NDRF,27
17 See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See infra Part III.
23 Id.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 Coffin, supra note 1.
26 Id.
27 See Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-321, 60 Stat. 41 (1946)
(enacted); see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP. MAR. ADMIN., TRANSFER OF NATIONAL
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managed by MARAD under the direction of the Department of
Transportation, to store "inactive but potentially useful"2 govern-
ment vessels for future use in "help [ing] meet U.S. shipping require-
ments during a national emergency."29 "The vessels of the JRRF
are anchored in an approximately one square mile area on the
James River near Fort Eustis. The vessels are anchored together
in rows in a bow-to-stern alignment according to type and size."3 °
At its largest, the Ghost Fleet in the James River included
800 vessels, stretching from Fort Eustis to the James River
Bridge.3 ' The 1950s saw the rapid disposal of some ships through
sales to local salvage yards, use in Navy target practice, and U.S.
Department of Agriculture surplus grain storage.32 By the 1960s,
the number of ships decreased to about 300, as local shipyards and
salvage operations purchased them at auction and through the use
of purchase contracts,33 presumably to sell the steel for profit.
Government regulation eventually curtailed this practice.
The easy turnover changed dramatically in the 1970s
with the advent of federal environmental regulations.
And as laws governing waste disposal, clean air and
water, oil spills and hazardous materials have
become stricter and more complicated, the American
scrapping industry has lost interest. "It's not cost
effective," said Leo Marshall, executive director of the
South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairers. "To
comply with all the rules and regulations, you can't
break even. It's not worth your time and money."
34
DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET VESSELS FROM THE JAMES RIVER RESERVE FLEET FOR
DISPOSAL AT ABLE UK FACILITIES, TEESSIDE, UK ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT,
at 1 (2004).
28 id.
29 id.
30 Id at 2.
31 Harper, supra note 5.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 id.
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With the decreased profitability of the domestic scrapping
business, MARAD sank many of these ships to create artificial
reefs.35 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") ended this
disposal method, fearing that PCBs "found throughout ship wires
and ducts might harm aquatic life."3" Due to the increased
regulation, 130 ships slated for scrap were sent instead to other
countries (India, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and Turkey), v
where scrapping is comparatively less expensive and employee and
environmental regulations are greatly relaxed or non-existent. 8
As recently as 1990, a representative of MARAD testified
that the reserve fleet was created to fill a surge in vessel demand
during national emergencies and that the NDRF stood ready to
meet these needs." Other testimony at the House of Representa-
tives subcommittee hearings contested MARAD's claims about the
fleet's readiness.4 ° Congressman William Broomfield of Michigan
commented:
Calling a 45-year-old ship, which has not run in 25 of
those years, a national defense asset makes as much
military sense as reintroducing the horse cavalry.
You don't need to be a military or maritime expert to
figure this out. But in the dense bureaucratic forest
of MARAD things are obviously hard to see.4
35 Id.
36Id.
31 Coffin, supra note 1; Harper, supra note 5.
38 Coffin, supra note 1.
3' The Ghost Fleet: Utilization of Surplus Ships of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Regulation, Business Opportunities, and
Energy of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong. 30 (1990) (statement of
Capt. Warren G. Leback, Administrator, MARAD) [hereinafter Subcomm. on
Regulation-Ghost Fleet, 101st Cong.].
0 Subcomm. on Regulation-Ghost Fleet, 101st Cong., supra note 39.
41 Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. William S. Broomfield, Member, H. Comm. on
Small Business).
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In fact, the debate in 1990 did not focus on the environmental risk
posed by the vessels, but on MARAD's wasteful spending and the
assertion that these ships could be used as a national defense tool.
4 2
In 1990, Congress began examining the NDRF and question-
ing MARAD about the location of their scrapping practices, hoping
to use potential changes to MARAD's practices as a way to create
jobs for small business in the United States.43 MARAD claimed
that budgetary constraints and the federal mandate for the upkeep
of the NDRF forced them to either sell obsolete vessels to the
highest bidder or use the old ships in a trade for newer vessels."
IARAD's "responsibility to obtain the greatest possible return in
order to replenish the reserve fleet"4" required it to export for
disposal most of the ships deemed obsolete.46 The following ex-
change between Subcommittee Chairman Ron Wyden and MARAD
representative Captain Warren Leback detailed MARAD's policy
of putting economic gain ahead of environmental safety:
Chairman WYDEN. But the point is, virtually every-
one who is familiar with the program acknowledges
that there are serious environmental problems,
serious questions of health and safety for those
workers who are exposed to these materials [from
scraping the NDRF].
Now because of the program that you run these
materials go to foreign yards. Are you concerned
about foreign workers being exposed to environmen-
tal and health hazards?
42 See id. at 2-3.
43 Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Ron Wyden, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulation,
Business Opportunities, and Energy, H. Comm. on Small Business). Wyden went
on to say "[the ships] ought to be finished off in a way that will increase business
activity and provide new jobs to our struggling American salvage companies."
Id.
44Id. at 29-31.
41 Id. at 33; see also id. at 30.
46 Id. at 29-31.
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Cpt. LEBACK. I think I would be concerned about
anyone being exposed to that.
Chairman WYDEN. But not enough to try to change
it? Are you recommending changes?
Cpt. LEBACK. I didn't say that, no.
Chairman WYDEN. What is the agency [MARAD]
policy? Is the agency policy to ship everything over-
seas no matter what kind of environmental hazard?
Cpt. LEBACK. The agency policy is to obtain the
greatest return on the sale of the asset for the Fed-
eral Government.47
Exporting the retired vessels brought a small profit to the
United States, but the procedure was shut down in 1994 due to
questionable environmental and working conditions in the salvage
yards of India, Bangladesh, and China.48 The decaying ships have
since accumulated in the James River, with the total number
doubling between 1998 and 2003."9 Governor Warner labeled the
resulting situation "somewhat ironic"5" in articulating the need to
respect international environmental concerns and standards while
also protecting the James River and Virginia's ecosystem.5 '
Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis, with the aid of Senator John
Warner, secured $20 million for the removal of a few of the ships
from the Ghost Fleet in the 2002 Department of Defense Appropri-
ations Bill.5 2 These funds only removed some of the worst-offending
ships, and the remaining NDRF vessels in the James River contain
close to thirteen million gallons of unspent oil and fuel, nearly two
million more gallons than released in the Exxon Valdez's cata-
strophic spill.53
47 Id. at 46.
4 Weiss, supra note 2.49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Military, James River VA, http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/facility/james-river.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
" Weiss, supra note 2.
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II. EXPORTATION OF RETIRED VESSELS
Prior to 1994, and before they deteriorated and posed an
environmental hazard, MARAD exported a number of ships to the
highest bidder. This was possible due to the small profit that
foreign boat yards and the federal government could earn in the
recycling process.54 In fact, between 1987 and 1994, MARAD sold
130 ships overseas55 and earned an average of $600,000 per
vessel.5 6 Following the federal prohibition on the exportation of
PCBs and because of worker safety issues in these locations, all
foreign ship sales ceased in 1995. 5' The backlog of decaying ships
began to mount due to the limited capacity of domestic firms to
scrap these vessels and meet the technical specifications of
"environmental [protection], worker health and [worker] safety
issues" " required by MARAD. Bonnie Green, Deputy Administra-
tor at MARAD, stated on May 24, 2000, that "[flour bidders have
satisfied the requirements of MARAD's technical review since
1997, and only nine of the 22 ships sold domestically during that
time have actually been removed from the fleet sites. Three of
these vessels sold for $10 each."5 9 Due to the risks posed to foreign
workers and a lack of environmental safeguards in foreign
countries, exporting the problem is not a responsible alternative. °
14 Id; see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., supra note 27, at 5.
55 Coffin, supra note 1; see also Disposal of Obsolete Maritime Administration
Vessels: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 106th
Cong. 5-6 (2000) (statement of Bonnie M. Green, Deputy Administrator for
Inland Waterways and Great Lakes, MARAD) [hereinafter Disposal of Obsolete
Vessels, 106th Cong.].
56 Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 106th Cong. (statement of Bonnie M. Green).
57 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., supra note 27, at 5.
58 Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 106th Cong., supra note 55, at 6 (statement of
Bonnie M. Green).
59
Id.
60 Id. at 4 (statement of Hon. Brian Baird). Congressman Baird further noted:
"I don't think the United States wants an international reputation that we pass
our garbage and toxic waste to other countries. I don't think we want to say that
we are going to save our taxpayers' dollars by having foreign workers risk their
lives disposing of our ships." Id.
2006] 521
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 30:513
The domestic ship recycling business was founded on the
concept that the price gained for the scrap would exceed the
purchase of the vessel and costs to dismantle the ship.6' This model
ceased to work in 1994, however, and the federal government now
finds itself having to pay for recycling services.62 With an end to
overseas ships sales, MARAD's William Shubert testified to a
Congressional subcommittee that "MARAD turned exclusively to
the domestic market to sell ships for dismantling. However, only
a few domestic facilities expressed an interest in purchasing
vessels for dismantling."63 The problems in the domestic scrapping
industry started in the 1980s and were exacerbated due to: (1) a
"dearth of available [government] ships" 64 being recycled in the
1980s, (2) "[t]he discovery of PCBs in nonmetallic materials in
Navy [vessels]" 6' and the resulting compliance with "stringent
[Environmental Protection Agency] regulations found at 40 CFR
761, " 66 (3) the increased scrutiny from state and federal monitors
to protect worker and environmental safety67 and (4) the "erratic
and... low" 68 value of scrap metal in recent years. 69 The scarcity
of ships led to the demise of the domestic industry. Lloyd's register
of shipping reports that only 141 of the 7,235 ships recycled
globally in the 1990s were from the United States, forty-five of
which were MARAD vessels.7 ° In 2001, writers described the
domestic industry as follows: "All together, costs are up, profits are
61 RONALD W. HESS ET AL., DISPOSAL OPTIONS FOR SHIPS 15 (2001).
62 Id.
63 Disposal of Obsolete Government Vessels: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine of the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.marad.
dot.gov/Headlines/speeches/2003/7july03.htm [hereinafter Disposal of Obsolete
Vessels, 108th Cong.].
64 HESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 17.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 18.
68 Id.
69 HESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 18.
70 Id.
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down, and the industry, under the old paradigm, appears unable
to make money in the United States."7'
In response to the increasing number of decaying ships in the
NDRF, Congress took action in 2000 by amending the National
Maritime Heritage Act ("NMHA") of 1994 to include disposal of
particular vessels of the NDRF by September 30,2006.72 Applicable
vessels include those that "(A) are not assigned to the Ready
Reserve Force component of that fleet; and (B) are not specifically
authorized or required by statute to be used for a particular pur-
pose."73 This amendment to the NMHA also provides a set of metrics
to use in selecting the scrapping facilities.74 The directives in the
legislation for choosing scrapping facilities are contradictory and
highlight the government's divergent and mutually exclusive
aims.75 Simply put, this legislation does not provide the guidance to
reconcile scrapping these ships at the least cost to the government,
71Id.
72 National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-451, 108 Stat. 4769
(1994) (enacted).
73
Id.
74Id.
(b) Selection of Scrapping Facilities-The Secretary of
Transportation may scrap obsolete vessels pursuant to section
6(c)(1) of the National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994 (16 U.S.C.
5405(c)(1)) through qualified scrapping facilities, using the most
expeditious scrapping methodology and location practicable.
Scrapping facilities shall be selected under that section on a best
value basis consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, without any
predisposition toward foreign or domestic facilities taking into
consideration, among other things, the ability of the facility to
scrap vessels-
(1) at least cost to the Government;
(2) in a timely manner;
(3) giving consideration to worker safety and the environment; and
(4) in a manner that minimized the geographic distance that a
vessel must be towed when towing a vessel poses a serious
threat to the environment.
16 U.S.C.S. § 5405 (LexisNexis 2005).
71 See id.
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with consideration of worker and environmental safety, and
moving them the shortest possible distance. The language of the
statute specifically precludes "any predisposition toward foreign
or domestic facilities,"76 but Congress was aware of the dangers the
toxin-laden vessels posed to foreign environments." Additionally,
vessel exportation would "violate[U the Toxic Substances Control
Act, which bans the export of PCBs with rare exceptions." 8 This
legislation provides no explicit guidance for MARAD, as it is
internally contradictory.
Using the $10 million appropriated for the task in fiscal year
2001, MARAD dismantled six of the vessels domestically, but
quickly recognized that both the funding and capacity of the
domestic scrapping industry was insufficient to meet the Congres-
sional order.79 "The high costs and limited cost-effective capacity
of the domestic ship dismantling industry made it necessary to
consider the disposal of obsolete ships at qualified foreign facilities
in addition to considering other disposal options such as artificial
reefing and deep sinking of ships through a Navy program.""° The
domestic industry is not as cost-effective as foreign providers due
to the high standard of environmental and worker protection in the
76Id.
77 See Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 106th Cong., supra note 55, at 9 (statement
of Thomas J. Howard, Dep't of Transp. Inspector General's Office). Mr. Howard
further elaborated that
environmental dangers associated with these old, deteriorating
ships are increasing daily. The so-called "worst condition" ships
average 50 years old and have been awaiting disposal for 22
years on average. The ships contain hazardous materials such
as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos, lead-based paint
and fuel oil. Some have deteriorated to the point where a
hammer can penetrate their hulls. If the oil from these ships
were to leak into the water, immediate and potentially
expensive Federal and State action would be required.
Id.
" David Lerman, Court Hears 'Ghost Ship'Disposal Case Debate, DAILY PRESS,
Oct. 16, 2004, at C3.
79 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP. MAR. ADMIN., supra note 27, at 6.
80 Id. (citation omitted).
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United States. It is irresponsible for the government to ship this
problem to offshore firms that can offer cheaper disposal rates at
the expense of employee health and environmental safety.
A. The Basel Convention
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposals ("Basel
Convention") came about in the 1980s in response to increasing
environmental scrutiny of the need for industrialized nations to
dispose of their toxic waste.8 ' The Basel Convention introduced the
Basel Ban in 1989, with the intent of preventing developed
countries from shipping their hazardous wastes to Antarctica for
disposal. It was amended so that "[tihe Basel Ban decision
effectively banned as of 1 January 1998, all forms of hazardous
waste exports from the 29 wealthiest most industrialized countries
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to all non-OECD countries." 3 The primary objective of the
Basel Convention is to minimize the quantity and hazard levels of
materials produced, to dispose of these substances as close as
possible to their point of production, and to prevent the movement
of such wastes from one country to another.' A study published by
the OECD in 2000 explained the logic of the Basel Ban in this way:
By raising the costs of disposing of wastes, firms face
an incentive to produce less wastes, or produce
wastes that are less hazardous to handle, through
cleaner production processes for example. The same
81 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Origins of the Convention, http://www.
basel.int/pub/basics.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); Secretariat of the Basel
Convention, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.basel.int/pub/basics.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
2 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
basel.int/pub/basics.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
83 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, What is the Basel Ban?, http://www.ban.org/about-
baselban/what is baselban.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).84 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81.
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logic can be extended to restrictions on transfrontier
waste movements: restricting access to one more of
the alternative disposal options increases the pres-
sure for waste generation in industrialized countries
to be minimized at its source. 5
More than 100 nations adopted "the 1995 Basel Ban
amendment prohibiting the export of hazardous wastes from
OECD to non-OECD countries."86 The United States, Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand led the charge to defeat the ban 7 and
remain non-signatories to the convention. "[Iun order for the
amendment to enter the force of [international] law[,] it will need
to be ratified by 62 [sic] of the Basel Parties.""8 Sixty-one of the
Basel Parties have ratified the ban, including the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and the European Community. 9 Basel Ban
opponents have argued that "developing countries might.., want
hazardous wastes as a cheap source of metals that can be obtained
through recycling rather than.., extraction."9 ° It was reported,
however, that "[in almost every case where this claim is made, a
true costing of the long-term impacts of pollution and health
impacts in the recipient country reveals the scheme to be a poor
bargain for the country importing the hazardous waste."9 The
opposing countries also do not like the way the ban splits the world
85 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, The Basel Ban Amendment: The First Step Toward
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes (Apr. 2000) (citation
omitted), available at http://www.ban.org/aboutbasel-ban/esmban2.html.
s6 GREENPEACE.ORG, Basel Ban: "Countries Reaffirm Their Commitment to Stop
Waste Trade", Feb. 27, 1998, available at http://archive.greenpeace.org/press
releases/toxics/1998feb27.html.
87 Id.
88 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 83. Basel parties refer to the 82 nations
present at the Third Conference of the Parties. Three-fourths of those present,
or sixty-two parties, are needed for ratification.
89 id.
9' Jim Puckett, The Basel Treaty's Ban on Hazardous Waste Exports: An
Unfinished Success Story, 23 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 984 (2000), available at
http://www.ban.org/Library/ierarticle.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
91 Id.
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into two classes: either OECD or non-OECD countries.9 2 No classi-
fication system is perfect, but when the OECD countries produce
an estimated ninety percent of the world's waste, these countries
should take responsibility for "minimizing them at the source."93
Although the United States did not adopt the Basel Conven-
tion, it previously passed a law to monitor hazardous materials. 94
Congress adopted the Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976 in
order to allow the EPA "to track the 75,000 industrial chemicals
currently produced or imported into the United States."95 The law
in part reads:
(a) Scope of regulation. If the Administrator finds
that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture,
or that any combination of such activities, presents or
will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment, the Administrator shall by rule
apply one or more of the following requirements to
such substance or mixture to the extent necessary to
protect adequately against such risk using the least
burdensome requirements:
(6)(A) A requirement prohibiting or otherwise regu-
lating any manner or method of disposal of such
substance or mixture, or of any article containing
such substance or mixture, by its manufacturer or
processor or by any other person who uses, or dis-
poses of, it for commercial purposes.96
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1976).
" U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Toxic Substances Control Act,
http://www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/tsca.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
96 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 2605 (LexisNexis 2005).
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Under TSCA, the EPA determines the proper disposal of PCBs and
other hazardous wastes. TSCA also outlaws the manufacture of
PCBs after 1979: "[N]o person may manufacture any polychlori-
nated biphenyl after two years after the effective date of this Act
[January 1, 1977], and.., no person may process or distribute in
commerce any polychlorinated biphenyl after two and one-half
years after such date. 97 TSCA, therefore, dictates that MARAD
could not export PCBs from the Ghost Fleet vessels unless the EPA
Administrator, upon petition, finds that "an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or environment would not result."9"
The TSCA's prohibitions on the manufacture and disposal
of PCBs forced MARAD to petition the EPA in order to dispose of
the vessels and the toxins contained within.99 Although John Peter
Suarez, Assistant Administrator for the EPA, admitted that
"[m]ost of the obsolete NDRF vessels contain PCBs in concentra-
tions above 50 ppm [parts per million], [and] therefore their export
for scrapping may constitute a violation of TSCA,"1°° the EPA
granted MARAD's 2003 request to export these ships from the
James River. 01 This move supercedes the EPA's 1997 decision to
not allow the export of these ships for scrapping.
10 2
The new letter does require MVARAD to remove all liquid
PCBs and readily available non-liquid PCBs prior to moving any
ships.'0 3 Even with the mandated PCBs removed, however, an
estimated 100 tons of non-readily removable PCBs still remain
on the thirteen ships that EPA approved for export.'0 4 Whether
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Letter from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator for the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Environmental Protection Agency,
to James E. Caponiti, Associate Administrator for National Security, Maritime
Administration (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/
evidence/epaenforcement discretion.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Suarez
to Caponiti].100 Id.
101 Id. at 1.
102 Id.
103 Letter from Suarez to Caponiti, supra note 99, at 5.
104 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, NEEDLESS RISK: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
SCHEME TO EXPORT Toxic WASTE SHIPS TO EUROPE 16, n.42 (citing Letter from
528
'1 HE GHOULS THAT WON'T Go AWAY2006] 529
the ships stay on the James River or are moved to foreign coun-
tries, PCB remnants present a potential disaster wherever these
vessels reside.
B. Potential Catastrophe of PCBs and Oil Leaks
Looking for the lowest dismantling price, an insufficient
capacity in the domestic ship breaking industry, and an indiffer-
ence in exporting toxic wastes, MARAD contracted with Post-
Service Remediation Partners ("PRP") in 2003 to dismantle
thirteen of the most decayed ships in the Able UK boatyard at
Graythorp on Teesside, with the hazardous wastes going to a
nearby landfill. °5 The obvious problem is that the plan requires
towing the most fragile vessels 4,000 miles to England from their
current location in the James River. This decision makes clear that
MARAD considers the towing distance the lowest priority in the
calculus of dismantling these vessels. "Towing these particular
vessels, particularly in a tandem tow, can pose a very serious
threat to the environment, and yet the US [sic] government has
opted for a very long towing distance compared to the highly
reputable options available to it domestically."'0 ' Indeed, the 698
tons of PCBs, 1,402 tons of asbestos, and 3,300 tons of fuel oil
aboard these ships pose a grave environmental risk, one that
increases the further the distance the ships move from their
current location. 10
7
Leaks of on-board PCBs and other toxic substances pose one
of the major risks in moving these vessels such long distances.
PCBs are "synthesized compounds ... marketed... in electrical
equipment, paints and pesticides .... [They] have several valuable
characteristics, including non-flamability, stability, low solubility
Curt J. Michanezyk, Ship Disposal Program Manager of MARAD, to David
Fellows, UK Environmental Agency (July 15, 2003)).
105 Impact, Able UK and the US Ghost Fleet, Breaking Up the Ghost Fleet--a
Factsheet, http://www.impact-teesside.org/ablel.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
106 NEEDLESS RISK, supra note 104, at 13.
107 Id. at 1.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 30:513
in water, and low electrical conductivity."108 MARAD has suggested
that non-liquid PCBs do not pose the same risk to the environment
as their liquid forms, but
[tihe notion that liquid PCBs pose a greater threat to
the marine environment denies the chemical proper-
ties of PCBs. They were used and coveted for their
propensity not to solidify. When placed into a solid or
non-liquid matrix, they still retained that quality and
easily leach out into the environment.'0 9
PCBs separate from water, attach to the sediment at the bottom of
a water body, and can push the contamination up the food chain
through bottom feeders and other aquatic life. 01
One of the most unsettling aspects of PCB contamination is
that through the process ofbioaccumulation, the chemicals become
more toxic as they move up the food chain."' Extended exposure to
these agents in humans can lead to cancer, reproductive failures,
and hormone imbalances." 2 The EPA suggests that parental
exposure to PCBs can lead to problems in their children, including
learning disabilities, hyperactivity, low birth weight and reduced
immunity to fight infections." 3 Uncertainty exists about how much
PCB exposure is necessary to incur these health risks, but when
evaluating the impact of General Electric's release of PCBs into
the Hudson River, the EPA found that "people who eat fish from
the Upper Hudson River once a week face the risk of one additional
108 Lauren MacLanahan, Note, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and the "Mega Rule":
Will it Have the Mega-Impact the EPA Desired?, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 345 (2000) (citations omitted).
109 NEEDLESS RIsK, supra note 104, at 24.
110 ExtoxNet FAQs, PCB Contamination of Food, http://extoxnet.orst.edu/faqs/
foodconlpcb.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
111 Eric Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling General Electric Down
the River: A Law and Economics Analysis fo the $460 Million Hudson River
Clean Up Plan, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409, 411 (2002).
112 ExtoxNet FAQs, supra note 110.
"I NEEDLESS RIsK, supra note 104, at 39 (citing Clearwater Fact Sheet 12, What
are the Human Health Effects of PCBs, available at www.clearwater.org).
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case of cancer for every 1,000 people, which is unacceptable under
Superfund's tolerated risk of 1 in 10,000.""1
It is difficult to estimate the devastation from the release of
PCBs if one of the Ghost Fleet were to sink because the vessel(s)
could sink in the James River, or in another body of water during
transit. If not removed from the James River and properly disman-
tled, the devastating impact of PCB contamination in our fisheries
is well documented.115 Contaminated fish pose the greatest risk of
PCB exposure to humans, but exposure through contaminated
drinking water and PCB releases in the air can also occur." 6
There is great debate about the most effective clean-up
method once contamination occurs. One solution offered for the
Hudson River clean-up involved using the cutterhead suction
dredge, a method designed to remove contaminated sediments
while decreasing the risk of sediment resuspension in the water
column." 7 The PCBs can be separated from the removed sediment
or destroyed by breaking apart the molecules.11 Dr. Dick Luthy, a
professor at Stanford University, does not endorse dredging
technology because "[i]f you dredge, you basically destroy the
habitat.""9 Another method to handle PCB contamination is
capping, where clean sediment is placed on top of contaminated
soil. 2 ' Dr. Luthy favors a process called Aquamog, which "us[es] a
giant floating rototiller... [to mix] activated carbon"'2' with the
114 Claudio, supra note 111, at 435.
115 See, e.g., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Sheboygan River Area of Concern,
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/aoc/sheboygan.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).11 6 Clearwater Fact Sheet 8, PCB Contamination of the Hudson-Is Dredging an
Appropriate Cleanup Strategy?, http://www.clearwater.org/news/fs8.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006).
117 Id.
118 Id. (stating that "separation technologies... remove PCBs from sediments to
produce a smaller volume of more concentrated PCBs[,] and destruction
technologies ... break apart PCB molecules").
119 Amit Asaravala, Cleaning Up After Ourselves, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 3, 2004,
available at http'//www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,64832,00.html (quoting
Dr. Dick Luthy, Stanford Professor).
120 Id.
121 Id.
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PCBs, so that the PCBs will be "less likely to accumulate in [living
organisms] .,,122 No clean-up method can eradicate all PCB contami-
nation, and the best course of action is prevention-these ships out
from the water and have them dismantled before the chemicals can
do any damage to our waterways.
The unspent oil in the Ghost Fleet poses a significant threat
to the environment from a spill, or if one of the vessels sinks.
"Scientists studying the aftermath of the [Exxon] Valdez spill
discovered that the environmental devastation caused by an oil
spill of that magnitude lasts much longer than previously thought
... [a]nd ... that toxic compounds found in oil can adversely affect
marine species even at very low concentrations."'23 Buried and
subsurface oil that remains after a spill poses a greater long term
danger because of the difficulty of removing unseen deposits and
because these pockets of oil may appear after storms, animal
disruptions, or any disturbance event. 124 Even after the clean-up
efforts in Prince William Sound from the Valdez spill, a 2001 study
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration found
that oil remained at fifty-eight percent of the sites.125 In fact, 5,800
meters of the 8,000 meters of shoreline were still contaminated
twelve years later.126 One of the lessons learned from studying the
Valdez spill is that
natural resource restoration as a concept is much
easier to deal with than restoration in practice. The
complexities of the natural environment, the diverse
interests and priorities of concerned constituencies,
and the number of trustee agencies each with a
differing mission, make restoration in the real world
122 id.
123 Bill Kearny, The Myriad Sources of Oil in the Sea, 2 NAT'L AcADs. IN Focus
16, 17 (Summer/Fall 2002), available at http://infocusmagazine.org/portable/
2.2.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
124 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Lingering Oil, http://www.evostc.
state.ak.us[Habitatllingering.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
125 id.
126 id.
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an incredibly difficult matter. In many instances,
proposed restoration strategies must be designed and
implemented with unproven methods, technology,
and ecological theory. Thus, the science of planning,
implementing, and monitoring the success of restora-
tion is both expensive and inexact, pointing to the
need for restoration research and planning in a broad
ecosystem context. 1
27
Another major risk to MARAD's proposed move of the NDRF
vessels is that the transport is greatly under-insured. 121 In fact,
"the amount of insurance for Pollution (sudden and accidental
liability) will be at $5 million per occurrence, " 129 which is grossly
inadequate considering that "MARAD's own worst-case scenario
for a spill in the James River from the JRRF fleet would entail
damages of $123 million dollars [sic]." o Additionally, two domestic
salvage firms satisfactory to MARAD placed bids lower for the
same thirteen vessels than did PRP/Able UK, which ultimately
secured the contract.13 ' ISL, located in Brownsville, Texas,
submitted a bid that was $4.9 million lower. 132 Had that bid been
accepted, it would have decreased the towing distance by 3,400
nautical miles. 3 3 MIARAD might have avoided the open sea tow
altogether and saved almost $500,000 by selecting Bay Bridge
Enterprises, LLC, a company in Chesapeake, Virginia.3 3 This
record illustrates the government's desire to export our waste at
the expense of creating jobs domestically and potentially contami-
nating foreign environments.
127 Grayson Reed Cecil & Nancy Foster, Natural Resource Injury at Oil Spills:
A New Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 423, 426 (1993).
128 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 12.
12 9 Id.
130Id.
131 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 15.
13 2 Id.
133 Id. (the towing distance to Texas of 1,428 nautical miles subtracted from the
4,829 nautical miles distance to the U.K.).13 4 Id,
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C. Methods Employed by England and Other Developed
Nations in Salvaging Their Fleets
Understanding the scope and context of the United States'
problems in recycling their aged fleets requires an examination of
how other developed nations dispose of their ships, particularly
since other countries do not support the exportation of toxic
wastes. The ship breaking needs of Britain, France, and Germany
are substantially different from those of the United States. The
European navies supply a minuscule number of ships to the ship
recycling industry, because the European fleets are so small
relative to the United States.
Together [European navies] deploy only six small
aircraft carriers, including four VSTOL/helicopter
carriers, compared to the U.S. active inventory of 12
very large aircraft carriers. European members of
NATO operate a total of 225 principal surface com-
batants (frigates or larger warships); the U.S. inven-
tory is 130. Thus, the individual European navies
simply lack the raw numbers in terms of ships and
tonnage to contribute much to the international
supply of ships for recycling. 135
As a result of this reduced supply, the European navies often sell
their ships to developing countries' navies and escape the ship
scrapping duty by passing it on to the purchasing country.136 In
fact, the purchasers, whether a government or private actor, can
"dump the ships in India and avoid paying"137 the high costs
associated with a healthy and environmentally sound dismantling
effort. 3 ' It has been suggested that the few small European ships
135 HESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 51.
13 6 Id.
"' David Lerman, Fleet Casts Shadow on Ship-Breaking, DAILY PRESS, Nov. 28,
2004, at A8.
13 8 id.
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scrapped by their original owners are indicative of Europe's greater
emphasis on environmental matters and efforts to abide by the
Basel Convention.'39 This seems to be a dubious claim, however, as
these European nations have not taken an active role in helping
developing countries dismantle the ships in a safe and environ-
mentally friendly manner.
In addition to selling their vessels, European nations also
reserve some in long term storage, an idea similar to the United
States' NDRF, or convert the ships to new functions.' 4 The United
Kingdom's House of Commons Select Committee on Environment,
Food, and Rural Affairs recognized in November 2004 that they
were "not aware of any facilities in England and Wales with the
full complement of licenses required to recycle defunct vessels."'
In addition to the environmental problems associated with ship
recycling, economic evidence indicates a lack of demand for recycled
materials among industry in Western Europe. The steel in a vessel
is worth $10 a ton in Europe, compared to a price of $390 to $410 a
ton in India and Bangladesh. 42 Also, the great fluctuations in the
supply of vessels for the recycling industry cannot adequately
support a permanent labor force or high fixed costs, pushing the
industry to approach less developed countries with a large supply
of cheap labor and little need for capital equipment. 143
Ship recycling exists in seventy-nine countries, but is cur-
rently handled primarily in India and Pakistan and supplemented
by dismantling efforts in China, Turkey, and Bangladesh. 1' The
yards in India, home to the world's largest ship recycling industry,
139Id.
140d.
141 Memorandum Submitted by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency: Dismantling
of Defunct Ships, The United Kingdom Parliament-House of Commons, Select
Committee on Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Nov. 11, 2004) 7, available
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvfru/834/
834we09.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum on Dismantling
of Defunct Ships].
142 Id. % 12.
143 HESS ETAL., supra note 61, at 42.
144 Id.
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recycled forty-one percent of the world's ships in 1998 due in part
to the fact that labor only accounts for six percent of the expense
in dismantling a ship. 45 The following account made by an
Indian consulting firm illustrates the environmental impacts of
recycling a merchant ship and underlines the importance of
creating universal regulations on the dismantling of retired ships.
On average, between 4,000 and 5,000 kg of asbestos
insulation is also present, along with an additional
50 tons as joiner bulkheads. Paint is left on the steel
plates when they are removed and sent for rerolling
or remelting. Asbestos products are sold for reuse, as
are PCB oils from the ship's electric and hydraulic
machinery. The Alang yards annually generate about
2,400 metric tons of hazardous wastes such as oil
sludge and paint chips. In the past, all wastes,
hazardous or not, were dumped in the sea or in
nearby low-lying areas. 141
The "[1ack of ship recycling facilities . . . in OECD
countries"147 that can properly "handle hazardous wastes" 14 and
decontaminate vessels presents a major challenge in disposing of
these ships and can lead to great expense in terms of "port dues,
maintenance and crew costs."'49 Additionally, the legal status of a
ship at the end of its life is complicated due to the international
nature of shipping and the various guidelines that have been
recommended for the world; including the European Union's Waste
Shipment Regulation, International Maritime Organization
("IMO") guidelines under the auspices of the United Nations, and
145 Id. at 43. See generally id. at 43-47 (outlining costs and revenues of ship
recycling/dismantling activities for India).
146 Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
147 Memorandum on Dismantling of Defunct Ships, supra note 141, 1 10.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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the Basel Ban. 15' Greenpeace and other environmental organiza-
tions have been very critical of the lack of cohesion amongst the
various plans.
The present IMO guidelines appears [sic] to be an
elaborate exercise to protect the shipping industry
from responsibility by pretending that the Basel
Convention, its obligations and decisions, has little
scope over ships-as-hazardous-waste (a position that
is legally indefensible). Even more egregious from a
moral point of view, is that the present guidelines
pass the burden for economically motivated toxic
waste export on the "recycling state"-these are the
developing countries that to this day the shipping
industry has seen fit to exploit.151
The United Kingdom's House of Commons Select Committee on
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs suggested a two prong
solution to the problem: specifically, to keep vessels of OECD
nations in their countries of origin (i.e., do not export the waste)
and most importantly, to spread safe technologies and environmen-
tal safeguards to non-OECD nations (mainly due to the increasing
number of ships on these countries' registers).'52 Britain's top
environmental minister has pushed for a ship dismantling yard in
his country because the country's need for such a facility with high
environmental standards will only increase. 153 Because the
European Union decided to phase out the use of single-hulled oil
tankers by 2007, two thousand such ships will possibly need to be
recycled, and there are currently no adequate facilities." As a
150 Id. T 14.
151 GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAIJBASEL ACTION NETWORK ("BAN"), The IMO
Guidelines on Ship Recycling Annotated, Nov. 21, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.ban.org(Library/greenpeace-ban-iii-3e.pdf.
152 Supra note 141.
153 David Lerman, Ships Still Idle-James River Reserve Ships Locked in Limbo,
DAILY PRESS, Nov. 30, 2004, at A6.
154 Lerman, supra note 137.
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result, the United Kingdom's executive director of Greenpeace
suggested that "Britain must take an international lead in
recycling ships and support the development of state-of-the-art
facilities in the U.K."1
55
D. State of Current Legal Challenges
Once the sale of ships overseas as a disposal method was
ended in 1994, MARAD was forced to turn to the domestic market
to get rid of the ships. 156 Due to declining prices in the scrap metal
industry, and increased safety and hazardous material disposal
costs, the domestic program came to an end and the ships began to
accumulate in the James River.157 From 1997 to 2000, the fleet
grew by 60 vessels because MARAD was prohibited by statute from
paying for dismantling services. 15' This problem prompted the
Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General to
name the disposal of these ships as a top-ten challenge facing the
department in 2000 and 200 1.159
Another problem was that both the EPA and a directive
from then-Vice President Al Gore forbade the exportation of these
ships due to the PCBs on board. 6 ° While the EPA initially
acknowledged that "[mlost of the obsolete NDRF vessels contain
PCBs in concentrations above 50 ppm, therefore their export for
scrapping may constitute a violation of TSCA,"161 the agency
nevertheless granted permission to export as long as MARAD
agreed that the ships would "be free of liquid and readily remov-
able solid PCBs equal to or greater than 50 ppm."
162
.
55 Lerman, supra note 153 (quoting Stephen Tindale, Greenpeace UK Executive
Director).
156 Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 108th Cong., supra note 63.
157Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160d.
161 Letter from Suarez to Caponiti, supra note 99.
16 2 Letter from James E. Caponiti, Associate Administrator for National Security,
to John P. Suarez, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
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In spite of the economic strength and industrial might of the
United States, there are only about six domestic companies with
the ability to scrap ships. 163 Large shipyards, including Northrop
Grumman Newport News, do not want to engage in the business
due to the risks involved and the specialized abilities needed to
perform the scrapping properly.' While MARAD contracted with
some of these domestic companies for disposal, MARAD found that
"no U.S. disposal facility currently has the capacity to accommo-
date a large number of ships simultaneously or can fully meet the
cost-effectiveness required by MARAD to meet the congressionally-
imposed deadline of September 2006, especially given the level of
funding appropriated." 16
5
In July 2003, MARAD announced a contract that paid Able
UK $17.8 million to dispose of fifteen ships from the NDRF in the
James River.'66 The plan involved "tow[ing] the ships [across the
Atlantic Ocean and] through the English Channel-the world's
busiest commercial shipping lane . . ". .,1" for delivery in
England. 6 ' The plan called for thirteen ships to be scrapped at the
facilities in Hartlepool, England.'69 The two remaining ships were
unfinished oil refueling ships, valued in the contract at a price of
$3 million. 7 °
Arguably, the two refueling ships sweetened the deal' 1
because both were ninety-five percent complete,'172 and construction
costs of $150 million had already been borne by United States
taxpayers.'73 These ships sat idle for many years because it was
Assurance, at 2 (May 7, 2003), available at http'//www.foe.co.uk/resourceevidence/
epaenforcement discretion.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Caponiti to Suarez].
163 Lerman, supra note 137.
164 Id.
165 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., supra note 27, at 16.
166 Lerman, supra note 137.
167 Coffin, supra note 1.
168 Id.
169 Lerman, supra note 137.
170 id.
171 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 36.
172 Id.
173 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 36.
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illegal to sell them, but language placed in the 1999 Defense
Appropriations Bill would have allowed MARAD to sell them to
member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO"). 7 4 According to industry insiders, these two ships could
have yielded a profit of $150 million once completed,'75 and
provided a huge financial incentive for Able UK to take the other
thirteen ships, thereby shrouding the whole contract in a cloud
of suspicion.'76
One of the greatest risks posed by the transport of these
ships was that they were to be towed to England in tandem, even
though insurance was difficult to find for transport using that
method.' Tandem towing makes the vessels more difficult to
control in bad weather and has previously caused vessels to sink
after they collided. 7 Although MARAD agreed to remove readily
available non-liquid PCBs and all liquid PCBs, an abundance of
non-liquid PCBs still remained, posing a terrible threat to marine
life in the event one of these ships sank.'79 In addition to the
hazards posed by the transportation of these vessels, Britain's
willingness to accept them was itself an apparent violation of the
Basel Convention.' Under the Basel Convention, the exportation
of hazardous wastes is only acceptable when the exporting country
lacks the technical ability to handle the waste or when the
importing country needs the waste as a raw material.' Neither
the United States as the exporting country nor England as the
importing country appears to meet these standards.
Tremendous debate waged in Hartlepool and throughout
England regarding the ships, with some residents excited about
the 200 jobs created, while others were angered by "American
174Id.
175Id.
176Id.
177 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 12.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 20.
180 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 34.
181Id.
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bully-boy tactics in the international arena."182 In addition, Able
UK's problems attaining the necessary permits resulted in its
inability to build the necessary dry dock.'83 Although Able UK
received a planning permit in 1997 to build the dry dock, the
permit lapsed when the British High Court ruled that the permit
only applied to the dismantling of marine structures, such as oil
rigs, and did not apply to ships." As a result, no work has taken
place on the four MARAD ships now in Hartlepool." 5
Additionally, some in the international community fear that
the Able UK dismantling contract was "the need by MARAD to
establish a legal precedent for getting around the Toxic Substances
Control Act's PCB export ban," 86 so that the United States could
export its remaining obsolete ships to the lowest cost dismantling
services provider.'87 Environmental groups brought suit against
the ships' exportation to England. The judge in the case allowed
four ships to be transported to Hartlepool, but issued a temporary
restraining order preventing the other nine from leaving the
James River without further review.'88
The Sierra Club, Basel Action Network, and Earthjustice
were the first groups to sue MARAD to enjoin it from exporting
these ships to England for recycling.8 9 On September 23,2003, the
consortium of environmental groups "filed a motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order ('TRO') to enjoin [MARAD] from exporting
182 David Lerman, For and Against-Some Say Environmental Risks Not High;
Others Disagree, DAILYPRESS, Nov. 29,2004, at Al (quoting Hartlepool resident
Neil Marley).
183 Lerman, supra note 137.
184 Id.
185 Lerman, supra note 182, at A6.
186 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 36.
187 Id.
188 Environmentalists Lose Lawsuit Over "Ghost Fleet," RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 2004, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/
Satellite?pagename=RTD/MGArticle/RTDBasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=1
031781420175.
189 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 32.
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ships listed in the National Defense Reserve Fleet's ('NDRF') non-
retention category," 9 ° and the court heard oral arguments on
October 1, 2003.11 The plaintiffs made the following three
arguments: (1) exporting the PCBs contained in the ships violated
TSCA, (2) the exportation did not provide MARAD "the best value
alternative," as required by the National Maritime Heritage
Act, due to the risk in towing the ships across the North Atlantic
Sea, and (3) MARAD failed to conduct an environmental impact
statement as required by the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"). 192
The TSCA allows for exceptions to the law "in extraordinary
circumstances but not without first undertaking a formal rule-
making process. " 19' The EPA granted an exception to MARAD to
move the ships, but did so after receiving a written request from
MARAD, not after following a formal rule-making process."' The
plaintiffs brought their TSCA violation claim under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ("APA"), which "by its terms, provides a right
to judicial review of all 'final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court,' . . . and applies universally
'except to the extent that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review[,]
or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law....'
"'195 The attorneys arguing for MARAD explained that the TSCA
did not apply to the ships because the vessels themselves are not
hazardous waste:
Cynthia J. Morris, a Justice Department attorney
who is representing the Maritime Administration,
said a car should not be considered hazardous waste
190 Basel Action Network v. Maritime Administration, 285 F. Supp. 2d 58, 59
(D.D.C. 2003).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 60.
"I BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 32.
194 Letter from Suarez to Caponiti, supra note 99; Letter from Caponiti to
Suarez, supra note 162.
195 Basel Action Network, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (quoting APA §§ 701(a), 704
(citation omitted)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
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just because it may have a thermometer that con-
tains a small amount of mercury. Likewise, she said,
the ships are not hazardous although they contain
some hazardous materials.
196
The court found that the plaintiffs did not present a "substantial
likelihood" of success on the merits of a TSCA violation and did not
grant "the extraordinary remedy of an injunction" on this claim. 197
In order to allege that the movement of the vessels did not
provide the best value alternative for the federal government
under the National Maritime Heritage Act ("NMHA"), the plain-
tiffs raises a claim under the APA.' 9' For the purposes of the
temporary restraining order, the court found that MARAD had
been working diligently within the mandates of the NMHA to find
domestic ship breakers.' 9 In fact, the court was convinced that
MARAD "reasonably determined that the proposal by Post-
Remediation Partners, LLC, submitted through the competitive
program, to dismantle and recycle ships at the Able UK facility
would result in the best value.""' Additionally, the court did not
grant the injunction because it found that MARAD had adequately
proved the limited risks in a tandem, open-sea tow, and that
MARAD would remove liquid PCBs prior to moving the vessels.20 '
In determining whether an agency has to perform an
environmental impact statement, the D.C. Circuit applies the
following test:
(1) whether the agency took a "hard look" at the
problem; (2) whether the agency identified the
relevant areas of environmental concern; (3) as to the
problems studied and identified, whether the agency
196 David Lerman, Court Hears 'Ghost Ship'Disposal Case Debate, DAILY PRESS,
Oct. 16, 2004, at C3.
'
97 Basel Action Network, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62.
198 Basel Action Network v. Maritime Administration, 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65
(D.D.C. 2005).199Basel Action Network, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
200 Id. (citation omitted).
201 Id.
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made a convincing case that the impact was insignifi-
cant; and (4) if there were an impact of true signifi-
cance, whether the agency convincingly established
that changes in the project sufficiently reduced it to
202a minimum.
Following the preliminary hearing in 2003, the judge found
that MARAD failed to comply with environmental laws and had no
viable reason for failing to produce the impact study, except that
the four ships were excluded as part of a pilot program specifically
instituted by Congress. 20 3 As such, the judge made the following
determination during the temporary restraining order hearing:
"[b]efore sending any additional NDRF vessels through the
Chesapeake Bay and United States coastal waters, MARAD must
perform, at a minimum, a supplemental [Environmental Assess-
ment] specific to [the remaining nine] ships that addresses the
environmental impact of such action in the United States."2 4 The
court recently found that the 2004 Environmental Assessment
("EA") and the successful tow of the first four ships sufficiently met
the requirements of the NEPA, and the remaining nine ships may
now be exported to England. °5
On March 2, 2005, MARAD's motion for summary judge-
ment was granted and the environmental groups lost their case to
prevent the exportation of the remaining nine ships.2 6 Aaron
Isherwood, an attorney for the Sierra Club, explained that all was
not lost, as the case brought attention to a "reckless" effort on the
part of the Bush Administration to export these wastes and
"brought the time and scrutiny needed to reduce safety risks at
home and abroad."207 The lawsuit also prompted MARAD to apply
to the EPA for a formal and public rulemaking procedure to
202 Id. at 70.
201 Id. at 63.
204Id.
205 Id. at 70-76.
206 Id. at 79.
207 David Lerman, Ruling Isn't End of Fight to Tow Ships to U.K., DAILY PRESS,
Mar. 4, 2005, at C2 (quoting Aaron Isherwood, Sierra Club attorney).
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address whether its exportation of PCBs is prohibited, or whether
the EPA will grant an official exemption for future vessels.2 °s
While the media coverage of the case raised awareness of the issue,
Aaron Isherwood is still skeptical of the Bush Administration's
approach to the exportation of toxic waste: "[Ihf we are serious
about building trust around the world, America needs to demon-
strate a clearer commitment to public safety and environmental
justice beyond its borders."2"9
With the federal court challenge removed, MARAD can now
export the remaining nine ships included in the Able UK contract
to England.21 ° MARAD remains committed to using oversea
scrappers such as Able UK when they meet high environmental
standards, and they publically stated that "[w]hile the court's
decision represents one critical step, MARAD will not send these
ships until all necessary permits from the U.K. are firmly in
place."21' This illustrates both U.S. and British governmental
agency sensitivity to obtaining the necessary licenses before
transporting any ships.212 A spokesman for the British Environ-
mental Agency said that it would issue no waste-management
licenses until Able UK obtains its permit to build the drydock.213
As much as the mayor of Hartlepool would like to receive these
ships to create jobs and develop a ship breaking industry, he
admits that "[i] f they [Able UK] don't get a planning permit, I'm
afraid the ships won't be able to come over."
21 4
A resident of Williamsburg, Virginia, and retired maritime
attorney Morton Clark filed the second lawsuit against MARAD
and the EPA on behalf of his wife, Lynn Clark. The couple retired
to the Kingsmill development just outside of the city limits of
208 Press Release, Earthjustice, Groups Claim Success Despite Dismissal of
Ghost Fleet Export Case, Mar. 3, 2005, available at http://www.earthjustice.org/
news/print.html?ID=966.
209 Id.
210 Lerman, supra note 207, at C2.
211 Id. (quoting MARAD written report not fully cited in article).
212 Id. at C1.
213 Id.
214 Id. (quoting Stuart Drummond, mayor of Hartlepool, England).
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Williamsburg, Virginia, and have sued to protect the James River
and their investment in a riverfront home.215 Morton Clark
succinctly expressed the potential for disaster in the James River
when he said, "[lt's just a matter of time before a storm or hurri-
cane blows those ships adrift, or causes collisions or sinkings....
Fuel oil would be all over the place. It's time [MARAD] got serious
about this."216 The petitioner's argument in the suit is that
MARAD and the EPA violated the Clean Water Act217 and another
federal law by not disposing of the Ghost Fleet sooner.21 The
complaint seeks to secure a court order to remove and dispose of
the ships "without further delay."2 19 Like many residents of the
Tidewater region, Mr. Clark wants to protect the natural beauty
of the area and he insists that the federal government must take
true ownership of these decayed vessels and remove them from the
James River.
In an effort to save money and resolve the cases more
quickly, MARAD sought to have the Clark suit consolidated with
the suit brought by Sierra Club, Basel Action Network, and
Earthjustice.22 ° Because Clark sued solely to have the vessels
taken out of the James River, and is not concerned with whether
they are exported, he opposed consolidation because of the differing
legal arguments of the cases.22' The suits were not ultimately
consolidated, and the presiding judge in the environmentalists'
case, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, indicated that "I'm not sure that
[consolidating the two suits is] going to work."222 In the end, a
215 Scott Harper, Couple Sue, Fear Possible Mishaps with Ghost Fleet, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 22, 2004, at B1.
216 id.
217 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 845,
62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (enacted) and Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (enacted).218 Id.
219 Scott Harper, Ghost Fleet Proposal Leaves the Rust Up to Them, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 27, 2004, at B2, available at http://home.hamptonroads.
com/stories/print.cfm?story=73578&ran=217730.
2 20 Id.
221 See id.
222 Lerman, supra note 207.
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group of maritime businessmen approached Clark to submit a bid
to MARAD to remove and dismantle all the ships docked in the
James River.223 Clark indicated that he "will act for the group only
if their proposal is accepted"22 4 and explained that their offer was
the first to encompass the removal of the entire Ghost Fleet.225 As
of July 2004, MARAD had announced no decision on the proposal,
because bids for government contracts are confidential.22 6
III. DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS TO DISPOSAL OF GHOST FLEET
Following the dismissal of its lawsuit, Martin Wagner, an
attorney for Earthjustice, said "[tihe best and safest plan [to
remove and dismantle the Ghost Fleet] is to scrap the Ghost Fleet
here at home."227 While this is a logical argument from the
perspective of a nation taking responsibility for the waste it
creates, the real debate on domestic ship scrapping usually
addresses the capacity of the industry, the costs of domestic
scrapping, and a source of funding to meet these costs. While the
lawsuit against MARAD concerning the export of the ships to Able
UK was pending, MARAD was forced to use domestic scrappers to
dismantle "about two-dozen other high priority vessels
stateside."228 In the past few years, three firms in Brownsville,
Texas-Esco Marine, All Star Metals, and Marine Metals, have
won contracts from MARAD as well as North American Ship
Recycling in Baltimore, Maryland.229 The use of domestic ship
scrappers supports some environmentalists' argument that
American firms can provide the dismantling service more safely
223 Harper, supra note 219.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Press Release, Earthjustice, Legal Challenge Keeping 'Ghost Fleet' Ship
Scrapping Jobs in the US, Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://www.earthjustice.
org/news/display.html?ID=915.228 Id.
229 Id.
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than can foreign entities by avoiding the long and potentially
treacherous open-water toWS.
230
Since 1996, MARAD has investigated the domestic ship
breaking industry. It utilizes the following protocol in researching
prospective firms. "[B]idders are required to submit a technical
compliance plan addressing environmental, worker health, and
safety issues. They must also provide business and operational
plans that describe their knowledge and ability to scrap ships."23'
Between 1997 and May of 2000, MARAD approved only four
domestic ship scrappers after the firms went through MARAD's
technical review process.232 Although MARAD did not approve
many domestic ship recycling firms, Frank Foti, President and
CEO of Cascade General, Inc., submitted a white paper to Con-
gress in 2000, which provided a plan to scrap the entire MARAD
fleet in five years:
We can [scrap the entire MARAD fleet using three
locations] .... We don't need to ask the government
to make additional capital expenditures for us to be
able to do this. We need only that there is a vehicle to
do this and a different law and structure and some
money to do it.233
While this proposal was not accepted, MARAD has awarded a
number of dismantling contracts to domestic operators since the
filing of the lawsuit over the Able UK contract in 2003.234 In
September 2004, MARAD contracted with a new firm in Baltimore
harbor, North American Ship Recycling, to dismantle two ships
from the James River's Ghost Fleet.235 This firm reconfigured the
230 See id.
231 Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 106th Cong., supra note 55, at 6 (statement of
Bonnie M. Green).
232Id.
233 Disposal of Obsolete Vessels, 106th Cong. supra note 55, at 27 (2000)
(statement of Frank Foti, President and CEO, Cascade General, Inc.).234 See discussion supra note 227 and accompanying text.
235 Scott Harper, 2 More in "Ghost Fleet" Slated for Environmentally Safe Scrap,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Sept. 14, 2004, at B2.
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Sparrows Point Shipyard, recently in bankruptcy, with a focus on
recycling vessels, like those still found in the James River.236
Part of the problem of the domestic ship scrapping industry
is MARAD's inclination to use foreign scrappers.237 When MARAD
was taking bids for the contract ultimately awarded to Able UK,
a MARAD representative said "the best option from a cost-
effectiveness standpoint (assuming it was legal), was to export the
vessels."238 MARAD was not totally unwilling to award contracts
to domestic providers, as it had awarded a five vessel contract to
Bay Bridge Enterprises, but it is telling that two domestic firms
bid lower than the winning bid of Able UK.239 International
Shipbreaking Limited, with operations in Brownsville, Texas, bid
almost five million dollars less than Able UK, and Bay Bridge
Enterprises's bid was lower by $500,000.240 From an environmental
standpoint, the Texas bid would have cut the open sea tow by
seventy-five percent, and the Bay Bridge Enterprises bid would
have eliminated the need for an open sea tow altogether.241
In addition to MARAD's apparent belief that they can get
the best value by dismantling the ships overseas, the larger
problem is that Congress has not properly funded the dismantling
effort.242 As the September 30,2006, deadline nears, it is apparent
that it will not be met-even though Virginia Representative Jo
Ann Davis warns, "[i]f you extend the deadline, it takes the
pressure off of MARAD, and I want to keep the pressure on to get
those ships out of [the James River] ."243 The Bush Administration
has recommended spending $21 million next year to scrap the
fleet, the same amount authorized in the 2005 budget.2 " While the
political push behind this issue is evident from both sides of the
236 Id.
237 BASEL ACTION NETWORK, supra note 104, at 14 (citation omitted).
238 id.
239 Id. at 14-15.
240 Id.
241 See id.
242 See Lerman, supra note 11.
243 Id.
244 Id. at Al.
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aisle, Representative Bobby Scott labels the situation in the James
River "an environmental disaster waiting to happen."245 The
contracts issued so far indicate that an additional $80 million
dollars would be needed to complete the removal.24 It is doubtful
that the requisite funds will materialize, as President Bush's 2006
budget increases do not even keep pace with inflation.247
Not only does MARAD need additional funding from
Congress, but the entire agency needs reworking. The Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") issued an evaluation report of
MARAD in early 2005 and reached the following conclusions: (1)
MARAD did not seek adequate funding for disposal of its vessels;
(2) MARAD is poorly managed and fails to make "sound
decisions;"248 and (3) IARAD used a faulty bidding procedure that
led to a "lack of transparency."24 9 Since October 2000, when
Congress extended the deadline for disposal of MARAD ships to
September 30, 2006, MARAD has only disposed of eighteen ships,
or twelve percent of their total inventory. ° The GAO report
faulted MARAD for not seeking sufficient funding: "MARAD's
budget requests totaled only $54.1 million between 2002 and
2005-or about one-sixth of the $350 million the agency had
estimated would be needed."251' The report also raised concerns
about the "ill-defined, open-ended solicitation for bids" that did not
provide sufficient transparency, and it addressed an absence of
fairness in the bidding process.252 Although the GAO report does
not allege any fraud or corruption in the bidding process, it is
particularly critical of the Able UK contract.2 3 As a result of the
241 Schleck, supra note 8 (quoting Rep. Robert C. Scott, D-Newport News, Va).
246 Lerman, supra note 11.
247 id.
248 David Lerman, Agency Finds Faults in Ship Disposal Plan, DAILY PRESS,
Mar. 3, 2005, at Al (quoting uncited GAO report).
249 id.
250 Lerman, supra note 11.
251 Id. (quoting uncited GAO report).
252 Id.
253 Id.
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criticism, MARAD claims it will abandon this contract bidding
process and establish a more simplified process that will provide
"a flexible, streamlined contracting approach."254
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ghost Fleet in the James River, and more specifically
the PCBs, asbestos, and oil contained in those vessels, presents a
potential disaster that could permanently alter Virginia's ecosys-
tem. It would not take much more than a strong storm or hurri-
cane to sink one of the ships, causing the release of PCBs into the
food chain and thousands of gallons of oil into the James River and
its tributaries. The media has publicized devastation in the past
few years, but the federal government has not responded by
funding the disposal efforts adequately.
Despite inadequate funding, the need to dispose of these
vessels safely and expeditiously has not gone away. The Common-
wealth of Virginia has no other recourse than to sue the federal
government for TSCA 255 and NMHA256 violations. The TSCA
provides that if "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that...
disposal of a chemical substance or mixture [PCBs, oil, asbestos,
etc.], or that any combination of such activities, presents or will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment, the Administrator shall by rule apply [specific] require-
ments."257 Failing to remove these vessels and the toxic wastes
contained in them is a clear violation of this provision, and
Governor Kaine should follow through on former Governor
Warner's threat to sue for their removal.258
254 David Lerman, Maritime Agency Halts Contracting Process, DAILY PRESS,
Mar. 15, 2005, at C4 (quoting uncited written statement by the Maritime
Administration).255 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 2605 (LexisNexis 2005).
256 National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-451, 108 Stat. 4769
(1994) (enacted).
257 15 U.S.C.S. § 2605(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
258 See Schleck, supra note 8.
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As part of the NMHA, the following policy is detailed:
It shall be the policy of the Federal Government, in
partnership with the States and local governments
and private organizations and individuals, to-
(1) use measures, including financial and technical
assistance, to foster conditions under which our
modern society and our historic maritime resources
can exist in productive harmony;
(2) provide leadership in the preservation of the
historic maritime resources of the United States;
(3) contribute to the preservation of historic maritime
resources and give maximum encouragement to
organizations and individuals undertaking preserva-
tion by private means .... 259
Again, the federal government's failure to remove the toxic Ghost
Fleet is a direct contravention of the NMHA. The most egregious
aspect of the government's violation is that it simultaneously
requires that MARAD ships be disposed of by September 30,
2006,260 and articulates the government policy to "use measures,
including financial and technical assistance," but then fails to
provide the funding to meet these legal obligations.26 '
While the disposal of the Ghost Fleet is required by law and
there is no dispute about the increased potential of catastrophe by
not removing these ships, the government has failed to sufficiently
fund the operation. In addition to the immediate health and safety,
concerns that could be assuaged by removing these vessels, it is
paramount that domestic ship breaking operations be used to
dismantle these ships. Not only should the United States bear the
burden of disposing of its own waste, domestic disposal of these
ships will spur the growth of a ship scrapping industry. A domestic
ship scrapping industry has been slow to form historically due to
259 16 U.S.C.S. § 5402 (LexisNexis 2005).
260 See 16 U.S.C.S. § 5405 (LexisNexis 2005).
261 See id.
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a sporadic supply of ships to dismantle, but with the MARAD fleet
and the impending ban on single hull oil tankers, the future holds
no shortage of such ships. In addition to the moral responsibility
of disposing of one's own waste, the United States will be violating
the Basel Ban in exporting PCB-laden vessels to other OECD
nations when the ban becomes international law. The United
States government and MARAD must take responsibility for
disposing of their fleet domestically, in the most safe, efficient, and
expeditious manner available to them.
